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COMMENTS
MONTANA'S STATUTORY PROTECTION OF
SURFACE OWNERS FROM STRIP MINING AND




With the advent of the energy crisis in this country, increased
attention has been given to the development of our great coal re-
serves. Although substantial deposits of coal were found in the east
and midwest, the bulk of the undeveloped coal reserves of the
United States lie in the western states.' In many of these states the
coal lies so near the surface that strip mining is the most economi-
cal, and often the only practical method of extracting it.
Montana is one of those western states with large coal deposits,
many of which are recoverable by strip mining.' But strip-mining
poses difficult problems in those states where it is employed. Be-
cause it disrupts normal surface activities by causing the temporary
dislocation, and sometimes, permanent destruction of the surface,3
strip mining has engendered bitter disputes between mineral and
surface owners in those instances where the minerals have been
severed from the remainder of the fee.' Difficult questions have
arisen from these disputes: Must the surface owner surrender, or
allow injury to, his surface estate in order to permit the mineral
owner to strip mine his minerals? Or is the mineral owner to be
denied the right to strip mine (which may be the only possible or
1. The Fort Union Coal Basin, which extends from Wyoming into Saskatchewan and
from eastern Montana into North Dakota and South Dakota alone contains 40% of the
estimated U.S. coal reserves. COAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN MONTANA, Situation Report of
the Montana Coal Task Force, January, 1973, p. 8.
2. A survey by the Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology (uncompleted as of 1974)
estimated 42 billion tons of coal in the 62 Montana deposits surveyed, excluding 6 billion tons
located on two Indian reservations. COAL DEPOSITS IN MONTANA, Montana Department of
Intergovernmental Relations, March 14, 1974, p. 3. Of these, 30 billion tons are estimated to
be recoverable by strip mining. Strippable coal is defined as a seam, having a maximum
thickness of 6 feet and overlain by 150 feet or less of overburden. COAL DEVELOPMENT IN
EASTERN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 8.
3. "Surface" is used here in the sense of the topsoil, other minerals and vegetation
which exist naturally and overlay the coal deposit.
4. Such severance may be effected by a mineral reservation in a conveyance of the fee,
by a surface deed, by a mineral deed from a non-public owner, or by a patent from the federal,
state or local government. 3 AM. LAW OF MINING § 15.13, at 144.
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economical method to recover the minerals) in order to protect the
surface owner? Or is there a middle ground?
These questions assume added importance in Montana as the
quantity of coal strip mined, and the area of land disturbed, in-
creases.' While the common law viewed mineral development to be
for the common good and accorded the mineral estate dominance
over the surface, the recent trend has been toward greater protection
of the surface estate. This shift appears to be the result of height-
ened public concern about the environment, and also as a result of
the image of mineral developers, usually large coal or oil companies,
as greedy exploiters unconcerned about the effect of their operations
on the surrounding land and on the people who live there.6 Montana
recently joined this trend by enacting statutes which give surface
owners greater protection against destruction of their land by strip
mining operations.
This comment will discuss the new statutes and analyze their
potential impact in Montana. Possible constitutional defects of the
statutes and potential avenues of avoidance of the constitutional
questions will also be explored. In this connection, a discussion of
5. The following tables indicate the projected increases in coal production and the
resultant disturbance of land surface. They were taken from the MONTANA ENERGY POUCY
STUDY, Environmental Quality Council Final Report (Revised Edition), June 1, 1975, pp. 119-
120.
Montana Coal Production Projections (Mil Tons/Yr)
NGPRP Proj. Indep. NGPRP
Year Intermediate MEAC (Accelerated) (Extensive)
1975 20 20.8 ------- 20
1980 41 50.8 57 64
1985 75 ------- 96.3 153
2000 133 ..............- 393
Source: North. Great Plains Resource Program, Draft Report, 1974; Coal Devel. Info. Packet,
Mt. Energy Advisory Council, 1974; Proj. Indep. Final Task Force Report on Coal, FEA, Nov.
1974.
Coal Production and Land Disturbed by Strip Mining
68-73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Tons/Yr ---- 14.4 20.8 28.6 42.3 49.8 52.2 59.2
Acres/Yr .... 288 416 522 846 996 1044 1184
Cum (acres) 690 978 1394 1966 2812 3808 4852 6036
Cum (mil) 1.1 1.5 2.2 3.1 4.4 6.0 7.6 9.4
6. James Haughey echoed this view in his paper, Severance of the Minerals and the
Severity of the Attendant Problems, appearing in WESTERN COAL DEVELOPMENT, Institute of
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation (March 1, 1973), at 4-1, where he stated: "A
new land ethic is developing which exhibits an increased concern for the rights of the surface
owner and a growing animosity toward the mineral developer-now often viewed as an ex-
ploiter, a despoiler of nature, greedy for profit."
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construction problems of severance instruments will be presented,
with particular reference to whether such instruments grant the
right to strip mine coal to the mineral owner. It is hoped that this
discussion will present guidelines for the resolution of similar prob-
lems of construction in Montana, should they arise.
II. THE TRADITIONAL RELATION OF THE SURFACE AND MINERAL
ESTATES
The common law of mining traditionally regarded the mineral
estate as dominant and the surface estate as servient in those in-
stances where the severance instrument or lease of the minerals did
not expressly establish the right of the respective estates. The domi-
nance of the mineral estate was reflected in the general rule that
absent an express provision in the instrument of severance to the
contrary, the mineral owner or lessee had the right to enter upon and
use the surface for exploration, recovery, and development of the
minerals, as was reasonably necessary.' This followed from the pre-
sumption that the grantor intended to convey, and the grantee in-
tended to receive, the full benefit of the mineral estate, and "there-
fore the grantor not only conveyed the thing specifically described,
but all other rights and privileges necessary to the enjoyment of the
thing granted."9 The basic test of the extent of the mineral owner's
right to use the surface was, thus, what was reasonably necessary
to recover the minerals, which involved consideration of the custom
or usage of the business or industry and of the standards of the
prudent operator."° Any use of the surface by the mineral owner or
lessee which was unreasonable or unnecessary entitled the surface
owner to damages for any resultant injury." The mineral owner or
lessee was (of course) also liable in damages for any negligent use
of the surface.' 2
The rights of the surface owner could generally be labeled as
those of "peaceful coexistence"' 3 - he had the right "to use the
surface for all other purposes not inconsistent with or interfering
7. Healy, Rights of Mineral Owners in the Surface, 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW
INSTITUTE 85, 91 (1955); Thompson, Surface Damages - Claims by the Surface Owner
Against Mineral Estate Owner, 14 Wyo. L. J. 99, 101 (1959).
8. 1 Williams & Meyers, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218, at 186.30; Healy, supra note 7 at 92.
9. Healy, supra note 7 at 92. This presumption is recited in REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
(1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 49-114: "One who grants a thing is presumed to
grant also whatever is essential to its use."
10. Healy, supra note 7 at 92.
11. Thompson, supra note 1 at 102.
12. Id.
13. This was the term used in Moses, Peaceful Coexistence Between Lessor and Leesee
Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 38 TUL. L. REv. 341 (1964).
19761
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with the mineral owner's use."', Thus, the surface owner could not
refuse the mineral owner or lessee reasonable access and use of the
surface without being liable for damages. In those instances where
use of the entire surface area was necessary to the recovery of the
minerals, the surface owner was left with no rights under the theory
of mineral dominance.
Many states also accorded the surface owner the right of subja-
cent support - "the right of the surface estate to the support which
it would require in its natural condition from the underlying es-
tate." In such states, although the mineral owner may have had
the right to use so much of the surface as was reasonably necessary
to extract his minerals, he was also subject to the concomitant obli-
gation to preserve sufficient subjacent support to maintain the sur-
face in its natural condition. Any subsidence of the surface due to
mining operation was compensable in damages to the surface
owner. '7
It should be noted that although these mining principles, with
the exception of the doctrine of subjacent support, were generally
formulated in the field of oil and gas, they have nevertheless been
applied to coal mining law where not theoretically inconsistent.
III. MONTANA's NEW STATUTORY PROTECTION OF SURFACE
OWNERS
Montana recently joined a growing number of states in enacting
legislation to protect, and perhaps enhance, the rights of surface
owners against mineral owners who seek to recover the minerals by
strip mining.
A. Eminent Domain
One of the areas of change is eminent domain. Before amend-
ment in 1973, § 93-9902 of the Revised Codes of Montana provided
that the power of eminent domain could be exercised for public uses,
one of which was defined to be the mining of minerals located be-
neath or upon the surface of property where title to the surface was
held by another. 8 This allowed owners of mineral rights to employ
the state police power to condemn the surface of land owned by one
who refused to consent to strip mining.
The 1973 amendment to § 93-9902 added the provision that:
14. Healy, supra note 1 at 92.
15. Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface in
Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAW INSTITUTE 497, 497 (1961).
16. 3 AM. LAW OF MINING § 15.20, at 179.
17. See Annotations, 35 A.L.R. 1137; 56 A.L.R. 310.
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15), as amended, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15) (Supp. 1975).
(Vol. 37
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[T]he use of the surface for strip mining or open pit mining of coal
(i.e., any mining method or process in which the strata or overbur-
den is removed or displaced in order to extract the coal) is not a
public use and eminent domain may not be exercised for this pur-
pose. 9
The proviso eliminates the availability of eminent domain to the
mineral owner who seeks to condemn a separately-owned surface
estate for purposes of strip mining coal.'" The public policy consider-
ations behind the proviso set forth in § 93-9902.1,11 evidence the
growing concern and regard for the surftce owner in the rush to
develop Montana's coal resources.
B. Surface Protection in the Development of Coal
A statute enacted by the 1975 Montana legislature extends
substantial, and unique, protection to the surface owner. R.C.M. §
50-1039.1 provides:
In those instances in which the surface owner is not the owner of
the mineral estate proposed to be mined by strip mining opera-
tions, the application for a permit shall include the written con-
sent, or a waiver by; the owner or owners of the surface lands
involved to enter and commence strip mining operations on such
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15) (Supp. 1975) amending R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15).
20. It should be noted, however, that the power of eminent domain is eliminated only
as to the strip mining of coal, and not other minerals. This is evident not only from the express
provisions of § 93-9902, but also from §§ 50-813 and 50-816, relating to the use of eminent
domain for open pit mining.
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902.1, which reads:
Policy on surface mining or open pit mining of coal. For the following reasons
the state's power of eminent domain may not be exercised to mine and extract coal
owned by the plaintiff located beneath the surface of property where the title to
the surface is vested in others:
(1) Because of the large reserves of and the renewed interest in coal in eastern
Montana, coal development is potentially more destructive to land and water-
courses and underground aquifers and potentially more extensive geographically
than the foreseeable development of other ores, metals, or minerals, and affecting
large areas of land and large numbers of people;
(2) That in many areas of Montana set forth in (a) hereinabove, the title to
the surface is vested in an owner other than the mineral owner, and that the surface
owner is putting that surface to a productive use, and it is the public policy of the
state to encourage and foster such productive use by such owner, and that to permit
the mineral owner to condemn the surface owner is to deprive the surface owner of
the right to use his property in a productive manner as he determines, and is also
contrary to public policy as set forth in paragraph four (4) herein below;
(3) The magnitude of the potential coal development in eastern Montana will
subject landowners to undue harassment by excessive use of eminent domain;
(4) That it is the public policy of the state to encourage and foster diversity
of land ownership and that the surface mining of coal and control of large areas of
land by the surface coal mining industry would not foster public policy and further
the public interest.
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land, except that nothing in this section applies when the mineral
estate is owned by the federal government in fee or in trust for an
Indian tribe.22
Thus, before a strip mining permit23 can be obtained, the mineral
developer must secure the authorization of the surface owner. The"written consent" required by the statute is defined as a written
statement upon a form approved by the Department of Lands
"demonstrating that such owner consents to entry of an operator for
the purpose of conducting strip mining operations and that such
consent is given only to such strip mining and reclamation opera-
tions which fully comply with the terms and requirements of this
chapter."24 Waiver is defined to be "any document which demon-
strates the clear intention to release rights in the surface estate for
the purpose of permitting the extraction of subsurface minerals by
strip mining methods."2" The ramifications of this definition will be
discussed later in connection with possible constitutional problems
of § 50-1039.1.
The application of § 50-1039.1 is not, however, as broad as it
appears to be. The section is narrowly limited in regard to the min-
erals to which it applies and the persons it is designed to protect.
Since the word "mineral" is defined in the Act to mean coal or
uranium, the section applies only to the strip mining of those two
substances."6 Likewise, "surface owner" is narrowly defined for pur-
poses of the Act as a person who holds legal or equitable title to the
surface and:
...whose principal place of residence is on the land; or who
personally conducts farming or ranching operations upon a farm
or ranch unit to be directly affected by strip mining operations; or
who receives directly a significant portion of his income, if any,
from such farming or ranching operation. .... 27
Surface owner consent is also required under the provisions of
the Landowner Notification Act.2" That Act applies to "all
prospectors for minerals, miners, or other persons contemplating
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1039.1. It should be noted that § 710 of S. 425, which was passed
by the 93rd U.S. Congress, but vetoed by President Ford, employs language identical to that
of the Montana statute. That bill has been reintroduced into the 94th Congress as H.R. 25.
23. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1039. Such a permit is required only by an 'operator', which is
defined as a person engaged in strip or underground mining who removes or intends to remove
more than ten thousand cubic yards of mineral or overburden.
24. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(23).
25. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(25).
26. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(1).
27. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-10 3 6(24)(a) and (b). The definition also includes the state of
Montana where the state owns the surface. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(7).
28. R.C.M. 1947, Title 50, Chapter 13.
[Vol. 37
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surface disturbance by mechanical equipment other than hand tools
on lands within the state of Montana. .. 29 Section 50-1303 of the
Act requires such persons, if they do not own the surface, to give
written notice of the plan of work and operations to the surface
owner and any owner of a possessory right in the land before the
land may be disturbed in any manner.30 Additionally, specific writ-
ten approval of the proposed work or operations must be obtained
from the surface owner of private land before the commencement
of work. 3'
The application of the Notification Act appears to be broader
in scope than that of § 50-1039.1. Because there is no narrowing
definition of 'mineral', the Act applies to all minerals and to all
methods of recovering those minerals which involve surface disturb-
ance by mechanical equipment,32 including prospecting operations.
It also appears to apply to all lands within the state, whether owned
by the local, state or federal government, or by private individuals.
There are, however, some limits to its application. It does not apply
to discovery pits on federal lands, "when excavated entirely by hand
methods with hand tools."33 Nor do its provisions apply where oper-
ations on the land "are performed in accordance with the terms of
a prospecting permit34 or a lease covering any mineral interest in
said land or other valid agreements authorizing such operations
which are in full force and effect."35 The "other valid agreements"
language would appear to include a strip or underground mining
permit, since consent of the surface owner, where the mineral has
been severed from the fee, is required before such a permit may be
issued.
36
At this point, it must be noted that several of the exemptions
from the Landowner Notification Act seem inconsistent with its
avowed purpose. The comment to the title section of the Act states
that it is:
An act requiring prospectors, miners, or other persons in this state
to advise the owner of the land surface in advance of any opera-
tions which will disturb the surface of such land and obtain author-
ization to operate thereon.37
29. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1302.
30. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1303.
31. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1303(a).
32. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1302.
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1304.
34. The prospecting permit is dealt with in § 50-1041.
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1305.
36. R.C.M. 1947, 99 50-1039, 50-1039.1.
37. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1301 (comment).
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In light of that purpose, why does the Act exempt a prospecting
permit from its scope when such a permit does not in itself require
notification of the surface owner? Furthermore, the § 50-1305 ex-
emption of a mineral lease from the coverage of the Act appears
unfounded in view of the fact that the owner of full mineral rights
to a tract of land is not exempted from coverage. :" Why should a
mineral owner be bound to give notice to the owner of the surface
when, if he had leased his mineral interest, his lessee would not be
required to do so? Such a result seems illogical.
C. Affect of Statutes on the Common Law
Secions 50-1039.1 and 50-1303 clearly abolish the common law
theory of dominance accorded to the mineral estate, replacing it
with statutory dominance of the surface estate in those situations
involving strip mining. The mineral owner contemplating strip min-
ing is no longer entitled to use as much of the surface as is reasona-
bly necessary for that purpose, but may pursue such mining only to
the extent that, and in the manner to which, the surface owner
consents. And the mineral owner has lost the privilege of compelling
that consent by means of eminent domain.
D. Practical Effects of Statutes
The most obvious practical effect of these statutes, which shift
the balance of power from the mineral to the surface owner, will be
to decrease the value of mineral estates and rights. In effect, the
statutes give the private surface owner a veto power over the strip
mining of minerals, whether they are owned privately or by the
state. A coal company or other developer will probably not pay as
great a price for coal rights in the future when it knows that for those
rights to have any value, it will also have to negotiate with the
surface owner to purchase the surface rights to strip the coal.
A concomitant effect to the decrease in value of the mineral
estate may be the increase in value of those surface estates which
were formerly subject to destruction by strip mining. However,
there may be little real impact in this area since farmers and ranch-
ers are not likely to immediately sell their land merely to cash in
on the appreciated value.
A possible effect on the coal mining industry in Montana may
be an increase in development costs for the recovery of the coal. Not
only will the companies have to purchase the coal, but they must
now also purchase the surface rights in those instances where the
38. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1305 (comment on amendments).
[Vol. 37
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coal is recoverable only by strip mining. However, this effect may
be illusory since the coal companies might have been required to
pay damages for surface destruction even if the law had not been
amended, although there have been no Montana cases on this point.
Therefore, any conclusion that development costs will be increased
is mere speculation.
Another possible effect on the coal industry may be the frustra-
tion of large strip mine projects or decreased efficiency in their
operation. In those instances where large strippable coal deposits
underlie surface estates of numerous owners, the coal companies
may be unable to acquire all surface rights necessary to mine the
entire deposit. Recognizing the fact that there are certain individu-
als, particularly Montana's independent ranchers, who will refuse
to sell at any price, the coal companies may be forced to mine
around such recalcitrant surface owners with resulting inefficiency
of recovery and possible increased costs. If a large number of surface
owners refuse to sell, the project may be defeated entirely. As this
discussion indicates, planning for development and prediction of
development costs will be greatly complicated by these statutes.
Thus, the coal developer would be well advised to give serious con-
sideration to these new pitfalls before initiating a development pro-
ject.
A final obvious effect is the beneficial result the statutes will
have in protecting the integrity and natural beauty of the land
surface in this state. Also, the landlowner, in those cases to which
the laws apply, will be protected in his beneficial use of the land he
owns. He need no longer worry about being unwillingly displaced
from the land he owns or about having his lifestyle altered or de-
stroyed. These are certainly important considerations when weigh-
ing the overall merits of the statutes.
E. Constitutional Problems
Some question may arise regarding the constitutionality of
§ 50-1039.1 - specifically, whether the section results in a taking
of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and of § 17 of Article
II of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The question arises from the
fact that the section prohibits strip mining of coal or uranium with-
out the written consent, or waiver, by the surface owner. However,
the term "waiver" is not specifically defined. The definition given
by the Act is "any document which demonstrates the clear intention
to release rights in the surface estate for the purpose of permitting
19761
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the extraction of subsurface minerals by strip mining methods.'
The question thus becomes whether the definition of "waiver" in-
cludes both express and implied grants in severance instruments of
the right to strip mine coal or uranium. If it does not, § 50-1039.1
would be an unconstitutional taking of those rights without com-
pensation or due process of law.
Judicial construction will be required to determine the precise
meaning of the term "waiver". Although the language of the statu-
tory definition requiring a "clear intention to release rights in the
surface" could be strictly construed to include only express grants,
a broader construction including implied grants will be required to
avoid any constitutional infirmity. Thus, one may cautiously sug-
gest and predict that the Montana supreme court, in light of the
general judicial policy of construing a statute so as to render it
constitutional, may hold that the definition of waiver includes both
express and implied grants of strip mining rights in severance in-
struments.
Assuming that the court does so hold, the next question be-
comes how to determine whether strip mining rights are impliedly
granted. Because of the broad meaning which must be given to the
term "waiver" in order to assure the constitutionality of § 50-1039.1,
the court must be careful to limit the instances where strip mining
rights will be implied in a severance instrument, in order to avoid
emasculating the provisions of that statute and thereby frustrating
the clear intent of the legislature. If stripping rights are broadly
implied in ambiguous severance instruments, the 'waiver' provision
of the statute would cover nearly all instances of mineral severance
and provide little real protection for surface owners.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF SEVERANCE INSTRUMENTS
A. What Minerals Were Severed?
In construing a severance instrument, the court must first de-
termine what minerals were severed. In the context of this com-
ment, the specific question of concern is whether the severance in-
cluded coal. Of course, there is no problem of construction when the
instrument enumerates or specifically identifies those minerals to
which it applies. Ambiguity and the resultant need for judicial con-
struction arise in those cases where the instrument broadly refers to
"minerals" or, particularly in the western States, to "oil, gas, and
other minerals." The question is then: To what does the term "min-
erals" refer?
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 50-1036(25).
[Vol. 37
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To illustrate the complexity of this interpretive problem, one
need only look to the thoughts of the West Virginia supreme court
in Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick and Tile Co.:
It would seem that this word minerals has no definite and certain
meaning which can be attributed to it in all cases. Its strict scien-
tific definition would include all inorganic matter, but it cannot be
said that in granting the minerals in a tract of land the term is used
in any such broad comprehensive sense, for if such were the case a
grant of the minerals would be a grant of the entire estate."'
This question has arisen in, and has been decided by, the courts
of several states. Only one case has dealt with the question in regard
to coal,4 while others have dealt with such minerals as gypsum,
bauxite, limestone, sand and gravel, granite, clay, uranium, and
iron ore. However, all of the cases serve to illustrate the approaches
which various courts have taken to the question and the guidelines
which they have employed in its resolution.
The basic principle upon which all of these cases are premised
is that in construing the instrument effect must be given to the
intention of the parties. However, the cases vary as to how that
intention is to be found. One group of cases has employed the
ejusdem generis rule, which provides that where general words fol-
low an enumeration of words with a particular and specific meaning,
the general words are to be construed as applying to things of the
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.2 The
Oklahoma courts have been the leading proponents of the use of this
interpretive tool.4"
Other courts, however, have rejected the rule, and at least one
has adhered solely to the scientific definition of minerals in resolv-
ing the issue. In New Mexico and Arizona Land Co. v. Elleins,14 a
federal court applying New Mexico law faced the question of
whether a reservation in a deed of "all oil, gas and minerals" in-
40. Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick and Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E.
684, 685 (1919).
41. That case is Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co. Inc., of Ky., 293 N.E.2d 510 (Ind. 1973),
in which the issue was whether a mineral deed granting an undivided one-half interest in all
"oil, gas and other minerals" under a tract of land in Indiana included coal. The court, after
admitting parol evidence of the circumstances surrounding the instrument at the time of its
execution, concluded that the parties had no intent to include coal and that the term 'miner-
als' included "only such other minerals as are produced as a component or constituent of oil
and gas from a drilled oil or gas well." 293 N.E.2d 510, 513.
42. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY.
43. See, Wolf v. Blackwell Oil and Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81, 186 P. 484 (1920); Cronkhite
v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960); Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cun-
ningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1972). The Louisiana supreme court also used the rule in
Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So.2d 228 (1942).
44. New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp 767, 768 (D.N.M. 1956).
19761
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cluded uranium. In holding that it did, the court found that ura-
nium and thorium were minerals within the scientific, geological,
and practical meaning of the term,45 and that extrinsic evidence was
not admissible to show the circumstances of the execution of the
deeds or of the intention of the parties."
In those cases where extrinsic evidence of the intention of the
parties has been admitted, an important factor has been what type
of mining was contemplated by the deed or reservation. In this
context, cases from Arkansas, Illinois, and Louisiana have reached
similar conclusions on roughly equivalent facts.47 In Carson v. Mis-
souri Pacific Railroad Co., the Arkansas supreme court faced the
issue of whether a reservation in a deed of "all coal and mineral
deposits" included bauxite, which was generally mined by open
pit." The court noted that if such a construction was given to the
reservation, the mineral owner could have entered the land to strip
mine the bauxite the very day after the sale of the surface to Carson
and thereby have destroyed the value of the land for farming or
other purposes. The court found that such a construction would be
extremely unreasonable, and therefore held that bauxite was not in
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract and thus
was not included in the reservation of "minerals"." The Louisiana
supreme court in Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen reached a
similar result in regard to sand and gravel. The case of Kinder v.
LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co. involved a mineral deed granting
the coal under a tract of land, together with a quitclaim of "the oil
and minerals, of every description" underlying the land, and raised
the question of whether the "minerals" included limestone lying
near the surface and recoverable only by strip mining.' The Illinois
supreme court held that the quitclaim clause of the deed could not"reasonably be construed to embrace minerals other than such as
could be removed by mining operations underground, which would
not destroy the surface for agricultural purposes."52 The decision
was based on the court's conclusion that:
In our minds it would be unreasonable to say his [the grantor's]
intention was to reserve only the agricultural surface above the
45. Id. at 771.
46. Id. at 773.
47. Carson v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Kinder v. LaSalle
County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v.
McKowen, supra note 43.
48. Carson v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., supra note 47 at 97.
49. Id. at 99.
50. Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen, supra note 43 at 232.
51. Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., supra note 47 at 538.
52. Id. at 540.
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limestone and convey to the grantee the limestone, with the right
to remove it, and thereby destroy all he had reserved."3
Perhaps the most instructive, as well as the most recent case
in this area is the Texas case of Acker v. Guinn." A declaratory
judgment action, the case centered on a 1941 deal purporting to
convey "an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the oil, gas
and other minerals" in and under a tract of land in Cherokee
County.5 At issue was whether the mineral deed also conveyed iron
ore underlying the tract which could be mined only by the open pit
or strip mining method.5 1 In considering the question, the Texas
supreme court cited with approval an approach suggested by Profes-
sor Kuntz:
When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without
qualifying language, it should be reasonably assumed that the par-
ties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface
estate, leaving the owner of each with definite incidents of owner-
ship enjoyable in distinctly different manners. The manner of en-
joyment of the mineral estate is through the extraction of valuable
substances, and the enjoyment of the surface is through retention
of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface, and
these respective modes of enjoyment must be considered in arriv-
ing at the proper subject matter for each estate. 7
Working from this perspective, the court held that the mineral deed
did not include iron ore recoverable only by strip mining, stating:
The parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think of the mineral
estate as including valuable substances that are removed from the
ground by means of wells or mine shafts. This estate is dominant,
of course, and its owner is entitled to make reasonable use of the
surface for the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily con-
templated, however, that the utility of the surface for agricultural
or grazing purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired.
Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed,
therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights'
should not be construed to include a substance that must be re-




Thus, it appears that in Texas the determination of what substances
53. Id.
54. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1971).
55. Id. at 349.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id. at 352, citing Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.
J. 107, 112 (1949).
58. Id. at 352.
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are encompassed by the term "mineral" hinges upon the single
factor of whether that substance is recoverable by strip mining." If
it is so recoverable, it will not be included in a deed or reservation
of the "minerals" unless there is a clearly expressed intention to
include it, which presumably requires specification.
Even if extrinsic evidence is held inadmissible, the method of
mining appearing in the deed or reservation may be determinative
of what minerals were intended to be included. For example, in
Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., which involved the de-
termination of whether "all the mineral and ore" included granite,
a New York court found that "the words 'minerals and ores', in the
grant of 1871, standing alone, would include the granite upon the
premises."' However, the court also noted that those words did not
stand alone, but had to be read in conjunction with the mining
rights granted by the instrument, which included "sufficient land
to erect suitable buildings for machinery and other buildings neces-
sary and usual in mining and raising ores."'" Reading the two provi-
sions together, the court concluded:
We think the reasonable construction of the grant limits the rights
of the grantee to minerals obtained by underground working, and
as granite is not so obtained, it did not pass under the conveyance
of 1871.2
A similar result was reached by the same approach in Rock House
Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick and Tile Co. 3
Thus, the usual methods which courts employ to determine
what substances are includable in a severance of the "minerals" are:
(1) the ejusdem generis rule of construction, (2) a strict definition
of the term "minerals", and (3) a consideration of the type of mining
rights which were granted or which would be necessary to recover
the substance sought to be included or excluded. Some courts have
even applied the rule of construing an instrument most harshly
against the one who prepared it.4 These principles and guidelines,
however, are not answers in themselves but are merely aids in deter-
mining the intention of the parties lying behind an ambiguous in-
strument of severance.
59. This is the view taken of the Acker v. Guinn case in Comment, Surface or Mineral:
A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 407-408 (1971-72).
60. Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 497, 42 N.E. 186, 189 (1895).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684
(1919).
64. Holloway Gravel Co., Inc. v. McKowen, supra note 43 at 233.
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B. Is Strip Mining Permissible?
Assuming that coal is included in the severance, the issue then
becomes one of whether the coal may be strip mined. The severance
instrument may expressly grant such rights, but where it does not
the courts again must look to the instrument and perhaps to the
circumstances surrounding its execution to determine if the parties
intended such rights to pass. In attempting to discover the intent
of the parties various rules of construction and interpretation are
used, some of which will be discussed in an effort to suggest guide-
lines for the construction of ambiguous severance instruments in
Montana.
1. Subjacent Support
An important element in the process of construction in those
states which recognize it is the doctrine of subjacent support, which
"relates to the right of the surface estate to the support which it
would require in its natural condition from the underlying estate." 5
Unless there has been a waiver," the surface estate is entitled to
subjacent support and "cannot be destroyed by stripping, quarrying
or open pit mining." 7 Although never used as the sole basis for the
refusal of a court to find a right to strip mine, the subjacent support
doctrine does serve as a foreceful rationale for such a holding.
Perhaps the strongest argument based on this doctrine was
made in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company v. Strong,66 in-
volving a suit to declare the rights of the surface and mineral owners
under a grant of all the coal under a tract of land in West Virginia.
The court, in holding that the grant did not include the right to strip
mine the coal, said:
Certainly if the owner of the surface has a proprietary right to
subjacent support, he has at least an equal right to hold intact the
thing to be supported, i.e., the surface, in the absence of a clearly
expressed intention to the contrary. 9
The subjacent support doctrine has also been relied upon in cases
in Colorado,70 Ohio,7 and Pennsylvania, where it is recognized as a
65. Twitty, supra note 15 at 497; accord, 3 AM. LAW OF MINING § 15.20, at 179.
66. See, discussion on waiver in Twitty, supra note 15 at 500-502.
67. Id. at 498.
68. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947)
hereinafter referred to as Strong.
69. Id. at 50.
70. See, Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794, 795 (1970); Evans Fuel Co. v.
Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023, 1026 (1925); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
71. See, Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688, 693 (Ohio 1954).
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third estate in land. 72
Although there is no Montana supreme court case on this issue,
a Ninth Circuit case, arising in Montana, has upheld a surface
owner's right to subjacent support. That case, Catron v. South
Butte Mining Company, concerned the validity of a district court
decree granting the surface owner the right of subjacent support and
requiring the owner of the minerals to conduct its mining operations
so as not to injure the surface.73 In upholding the lower court decree,
the Ninth Circuit Court stated: "We are not convinced that the trial
court erred in holding that the grantors therein were not absolved
from the obligation to support the surface."74
It should be noted that there are some authorities, and at least
one court, that feel that the subjacent support doctrine, which arose
in the context of underground mining, is inapplicable to situations
involving strip mining. That view is based on the premise that it is
meaningless to talk in terms of supporting the supre-incumbent soil
when strip mining by definition requires its removal. As one com-
mentator noted:
[T]he idea of subjacent support presupposes that there are to
remain in existence strata overlying the coal which can be sup-
ported either by leaving pillars of coal or artificial substitutes for
them. Why talk of supporting overlying strata which will be nonex-
istent if they are removed by stripping operations? 71
And as the Supreme Court of Ohio added in Skivolocki v. East Ohio
Gas Company, commenting on the subjacent support doctrine:
Time-honored rules of law, meant to insure the mutual enjoyment
of severed mineral and surface estate, cannot be blindly applied
to resolve a question involving the right to strip mine. This is true,
not because those rules lack present vitality, but because they are
dependent upon presumptions wholly irrelevant to strip mining."
Thus, while some courts have relied on the doctrine in determining
the issue of strip mining rights, its relevance to the issue may be
doubtful.
2. The 'Use' Clause
"The use clause is a phrase within the reservation specifying
72. See, Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 42, 72 A.2d 568, 571 (1950). However, in both
these cases, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized the doctrine of subjacent
support, it held that strip mining was permissible.
73. Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 F. 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1910).
74. Id. at 944.
75. Donley, Some Observations on the Law of the Strip-Mining of Coal, 6 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. LAW INST. 123, 148 (1966).
76. Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1974).
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the rights of the mineral owner as to his use of the surface for
removal of his minerals."" It generally provides for the right of a
mineral owner to use as much of the surface as is reasonably neces-
sary to recover his minerals." While courts have generally construed
use clauses broadly where underground or shaft mining was con-
cerned and where oil and gas were the subjects of the grant or
reservation, they have also generally held the use clause to be in-
compatible with strip mining on the ground that the right to use
does not include the right to destroy.
The leading case for the proposition that the right to use the
surface does not include the right to destroy it is Barker v. Mintz,
in which a deed to a tract of land in Colorado reserved to the grantor
all oil, coal and other minerals therein with the right to use as much
of the land "as may be convenient or necessary" to remove the
minerals. 9 Barker, who ultimately obtained the mineral rights and
sought to strip mine the coal, argued that strip mining was the only
practicable way to mine the coal and that the word "use" in the
reservation of the minerals encompassed stripping."' The Colorado
supreme court, however, rejected that interpretation, stating that
"use" could not mean destroy and holding that therefore there was
no right to strip mine." Similar holdings were reached in the cases
of West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company v. Strong2 and
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Company. 3 The court in Skivolocki
went even farther than the court in Barker, stating in a footnote:
To construe the 'right to use' as including the right to strip mine
would be to pervert the basic purpose of a principle designed to
mutually accomodate the owner of the mineral estate and the
owner of the surface estate in the enjoyment of their separate es-
tates.84
Where language in the use clause is peculiarly applicable to
underground mining, it is usually held to preclude strip mining. For
77. Note, Alternative Approaches to Analyzing the Intent of the Parties Upon Sever-
ance of Mineral and Surface Estates in Iowa, 60 IA. L. REV. 1365, 1379 (1975).
78. An example of a use clause may be found in the case of Barker v. Mintz, supra
note 70 at 534, which involved a deed of a tract of land in Colorado, reserving to the grantor
all the "oil, coal and other minerals" together with:
The right of ingress, agress and regress upon said land to prospect for, mine and
remove any and all such oil, coal or other minerals; and the right to use so much of
said land as may be convenient or necessary for the right of way to and from such
prospect places or mines and for the convenient and proper operation of such ...
mines. . ..
79. Id.
80. Id. at 535.
81. Id.
82. Strong, supra note 68 at 50.
83. Skivolocki, supra note 76 at 378.
84. Id. at 377, n. 1.
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example, in Rochez Brothers Inc. v. Duricka, a reservation of coal
contained "all the mining rights and privileges necessary or conven-
ient to such mining and removal, draining and ventilating of the
same. . ."I' The Pennsylvania supreme court found that "ventilat-
ing is a feature of underground or shaft mining" and that the parties
had no intention of granting strip mining rights." In Skivolocki v.
East Ohio Gas Company, a deed conveying coal and the right "to
construct and maintain all necessary air shafts" was held to be
limited to underground mining because the deed was "couched in
language peculiarly applicable to deep mining.""
3. Reasonable versus Unreasonable Interpretation
Since ambiguous deeds are by nature capable of more than one
interpretation, that interpretation which is more reasonable in light
of the circumstances of the parties at the time of contracting is to
be preferred over other interpretations which are unfair or unreason-
able, as more closely approximating the actual intent of the parties.
While the actual intent of the parties can rarely, if ever, be exactly
determined, the rule of reasonable construction insures a close ap-
proximation of that intent in most cases. Perhaps the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania best stated this proposition:
Where the language of a contract is contradictory, obscure, or
ambiguous, or where its meaning is doubtful, so that it is suscepti-
ble of two constructions, one of which makes it fair, customary,
and such as prudent men would naturally execute, while the other
makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would
not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes a ra-
tional and probable agreement must be preferred."
Such construction becomes important in two contexts: (1)
where allowing strip mining would render the surface grant a null-
ity, and (2) where to preclude strip mining, which is the only
method of recovering the minerals, would render the mineral grant
a nullity. The essential issue thus becomes a balancing of the rights
and interests of the parties to reach a reasonable result, which it is
presumed the parties intended.
In the first case, the goal is to preserve the interest of the sur-
face owner in maintaining the land intact by denying strip mining
rights if the coal or other mineral can be mined by other means.
85. Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825, 825 (1953).
86. Id. at 826.
87. Skivolocki, supra note 76 at 378.
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Thus, in Franklin v. Callicoat the Ohio supreme court denied strip
mining rights to the mineral owner, stating:
Certainly, it would be inequitable and unjust for a court to hold
that the owner of the surface received by his warranty deed only a
right to reside upon the premises until such time as the plaintiff
[mineral owner] desired to come in with the necessary equipment,
and remove the buildings, fences, [and] tear up the entire surface
of the farm.8 9
Rather, the mineral owner was limited to mining methods which
would not interfere with the agricultural uses of the land."
Similarly, in Benton v. United States Manganese Corporation,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the mineral owner's right
to strip mine, but only upon payment of damages to the surface
owner for injury to his estate. 1 To deny any right of the surface
owner to damages for the complete destruction of the surface, the
court said, would have rendered the conveyance of the surface "a
mere nullity."92
In the second context mentioned above, the situation is re-
versed, and the mineral owner's estate will be worthless if the right
to strip mine is not implied as to those minerals recoverable only
by that method. Such a situation usually arises in the context of a
grant of all the coal or other mineral obtainable only by strip min-
ing, so that a denial of strip mining rights will render the language
of the grant or reservation meaningless. Also, the land involved is
generally unproductive or unimproved, having little value in com-
parison to the minerals underlying it.9
Illustrative of this situation is Buchanan v. Watson, which in-
volved a "broad form deed" granting all the coal underlying a tract
of timbered land in Kentucky. 94
The only feasible and economical way to mine the coal was by
the strip or auger method, although the deed did not expressly in-
clude or exclude these methods.9" The court found that the principal
purpose of the deed was to enable the grantee to remove the coal
and that "to deny the right to remove it by the only feasible process
[would be] to defeat the principal purpose of the deed."" Thus, the
89. Franklin v. Callicoat, supra note 71 at 694.
90. Id.
91. Benton v. United States Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839, 843
(1958).
92. Id. at 842.
93. The relative value of the surface and mineral estates is an important factor which
is discussed in the text, infra note 102-109.
94. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. 1956).
95. Id. at 42.
96. Id. at 42-43. This was the argument made in a strong dissent to West Virginia-
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, supra note 68 at 54-56.
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court held that since the mineral owner had the right to remove all
the coal, "the particular method contemplated by the parties (in the
absence of language prohibiting other methods) [did] not preclude
him from utilizing the only feasible process of extracting the coal."97
The courts of Pennsylvania have also employed this principle
in several cases involving undeveloped mountain land in that state.
In Commonwealth v. Fisher the mineral owner, under an 1855 deed
granting him all the coal under a mountainous tract of land with
the right to "dig, excavate or penetrate any part of the said prem-
ises", sought to strip mine the coal." The court noted that the coal
was recoverable in no other manner, and held that the mineral
owner could strip mine even though that method had not been
anticipated by the original parties to the deed.9 The court went on
to say that since the land was unimproved and mountainous, any
damage to the surface would be temporary because of the mineral
owner's duty to reclaim the land under the Pennsylvania reclama-
tion law then in effect.10  Of similar effect is Commonwealth v.
Fitzmartin, which involved a reservation of all the coal underlying
a mountain tract, which could be removed only by strip mining.9'
In construing the reservation as including the right to strip mine,
the court concluded:
Unless, therefore, the words 'all the coal ...in ...the surface
of the land . . .' refer to and reserve the right to strip mine the
coal, they would be meaningless, because the coal on the surface
cannot . be removed by deep mining.02
4. Relative Value of Mineral and Surface Estates
As the preceding discussion indicates, courts are more likely to
construe severence instruments to include strip mining rights where
the surface is unimproved, undeveloped, and relatively worthless in
comparison to the minerals beneath it, than where the land is rich
farm land or has been developed or improved.' 3 The Pennsylvania
97. Id.
98. Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra note 72 at 570.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, supra note 72 at 894.
102. Id. at 897. It should be noted, however, that in Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Duricka, supra
note 85 at 827-828, the Pennsylvania supreme court refused to construe a right to strip mine
in favor of an owner of minerals underlying rich farmland.
103. Twitty, supra note 15 at 505-506 thinks such a construction serves public policy:
Certainly, it is more likely that the parties intended the surface could be stripped
by mining where the severance deed granted a surface of mountainous country than
where the severance deed granted a surface estate of rich agricultural land. ...
Other things being equai, it is proper for a court to favor a construction that best
serves the public interest.
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decisions are prime examples of that tendency - the Fisher and
Fitzmartin decisions granted strip mining rights where the surface
was undeveloped, mountainous country,' 4 while in Rochez Brothers
the court denied such rights where farm land was involved."" The
Kentucky court similarly allowed strip mining in Buchanan v.
Watson where unimproved, timbered land was involved, saying that
"the value of the land lay under the surface, not on it.""" Strip
mining rights were also upheld in Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining
Company in which a large percentage of the land was hilly and of
no productive value.""0
Perhaps the most illustrative case in this area is Barker v.
Mintz, discussed previously.'' Although the Colorado supreme
court refused to construe a mineral reservation to include strip min-
ing rights, the court ultimately allowed the land to be strip mined,
upon payment of damages to the surface owner, stating:
The land is wild, and its present value, except for the coal, is only
for pasturage, a very little of it for cultivation. The stripping de-
stroys these values, but the fair and equitable way is to so treat
the matter that each party will get the greatest amount of good
with the least amount of harm, and that is by allowing the defen-
dant to take out his coal and pay the plaintiff for the damages he
thereby does to her estate. He will then get the full value of his
property and she will get the full value of hers.' 9
Thus, the relative value of the surface and mineral estates is a key
element in finding a right to strip mine or, if not, in allowing strip
mining upon the payment of damages to the surface owner.
5. Circumstances at Time of Severance
Another key factor, upon which many cases have turned, is the
consideration of circumstances existing at the time the severance
instrument was executed, particularly the methods of mining em-
ployed in the surrounding area. Such evidence is admissible because
"the intent sought to be reached by the court is that of the parties
at the time the deed was executed.""'  Of special importance is
104. Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra note 72 at 570; Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin,
supra note 72 at 897.
105. Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Duricka, supra note 85 at 827-828.
106. Buchanan v. Watson, supra note 94 at 43.
107. Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1968). The court
also found that the original mineral grantee in 1905 appeared to have paid the surface owners
substantially the full value of their land, thereby purchasing the right to strip mine, regard-
less of how much more valuable the land had since become.
108. See, discussion in text, supra notes 78-81.
109. Barker v. Mintz, supra note 78 at 535.
110. Note, supra note 77 at 1383. This rule of construction is expressed statutorily in
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whether strip mining was commonly used in the vicinity, so that the
parties might have contemplated its use in the removal of the se-
vered minerals. If strip mining was not in common use, it is ex-
tremely unlikely, in the absence of other factors, that a court would
allow strip mining as being within the contemplation of the parties.
West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company v. Strong emhasizes
this general rule. In denying a right to strip mine, the court limited
the mineral owner to the right to mine his coal "by the usual method
at that time [19041 known and accepted as common practice in
Brooke County.""' The court felt that this did not include strip
mining and that:
To now contend that in 1904 the practice of strip mining was
known in this state to the extent that it was necessarily within the
implied contemplation of the parties to a private contract, we be-
lieve to be untenable.12
Conversely, where strip mining was in common use and was
known to the parties at the time of execution, the court may imply
a right to strip mine as having been within the contemplation of the
parties. For example, the Maryland supreme court in the case of
Department of Forests and Parks v. George's Creek Coal and Land
Company held that the parties to a deed reserving the minerals to
the grantor had no intention of excluding the right to strip mine
because strip mining "was a widely known and well understood
method of recovering coal" at the time of the deed."
3
6. Construction of Ambiguous Deed Against the Grantor
A final factor, which is of limited importance, is the rule that
an ambiguous deed should be construed most harshly against the
grantor."' Although widely recognized as a rule of construction, it
R.C.M. 1947, § 13-702:
A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable
and lawful.
R.C.M. 1947, § 13-713 also provides:
A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was
made and the matter to which it relates.
111. Strong, supra note 68 at 49.
112. Id. Accord: United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772, 775-777 (N.D. W.Va. 1955);
Smith v. Moore, supra note 70 at 795-796; Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., supra note 76 at
378-379; Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, supra note 88 at 99.
113. Department of Forests and Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 125,
242 A.2d 165, 170 (1968). Accord, Buchanan v. Watson, supra note 94 at 42.
114. This rule is expressed in R.C.M. 1947, § 13-720:
In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a
contract should be interpreted most strongly agninst the party ,,ho caused the
uncertainty to exist. ...
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is generally applied only as a last resort or in conjunction with other
more determinative factors. Thus, the rule was cited in the Pennsyl-
vania Wilkes-Barre case in conjunction with other factors, all lead-
ing to the conclusion that strip mining was not intended."' The
limits of the rule were expressed in Stewart v. Chernicky, where the
Pennsylvania court rejected application of the rule in light of other
factors of greater strength, stating that while the rule was a good aid
for interpretation, it should not be so liberally applied as to make a
contract the parties did not intend."' Thus, while the rule serves as
an interpretive aid in the absence of other aids, it should not be
applied to the exclusion of other more determinative factors.
7. Overview
Rules of construction such as those discussed above serve as
useful aids in the search for the intent of the parties to an ambigu-
ous deed or mineral reservation. Although no single factor may per
se be determinative of the proper construction, a combination of
factors may provide insight into what the parties actually intended.
Of the factors discussed, perhaps the most important are the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of execution of the instrument, and
the balancing of the rights of the parties to reach a reasonable result.
The question of which combination of factors will lead to a
particular result must largely be left to individual courts and judges,
working within the framework of the legal precepts of their jurisdic-
tions. However, at least one commentator has offered an opinion on
the question, concluding:
It is submitted that if there is a combination of the two factors:
(1) that at the time of the severance deed stripping was a known
and accepted practice in that vicinity; and (2) if the coal, whether
granted or excepted, cannot be removed in any other manner - it
should be held that stripping is authorized."7
Such a conclusion seems both fair and logical when viewed in the
context of the preceding discussion.
CONCLUSION
The recent enactment of statutes in Montana protecting sur-
face owners from strip mining is an important step forward by this
state in meeting the challenge of orderly development of its coal
resources. While the statutes may pose some difficulties for mineral
115. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, supra note 88 at 99.
116. Stewart v. Chernicky, 493 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259, 264 (1970).
117. Donley, supra note 75 at 149-150.
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developers, they provide important protection for landowners who
might otherwise be caught up in the wholesale destruction of their
land by strip mining.
However, some constitutional hurdles must be overcome before
the future of § 50-1039.1, which requires surface owner consent prior
to issuance of a strip mining permit, will be secure. Those persons
or entities having the right to strip mine coal by virtue of an express
or implied grant in a severance instrument may challenge the stat-
ute as an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law. To avoid this challenge the Montana supreme court
must be prepared to broadly construe the waiver provision of the
statute to include such rights. Failure by the court to so construe
the statute will result not only in its demise but also in the frustra-
tion of the legislative intent to protect Montana surface owners and
provide for the orderly development of the state's coal.
While a broad construction of the waiver provision of § 50-
1039.1 is necessary to prevent its unconstitutionality, the court must
also be aware of the need to narrowly limit the implication of coal
strip mining rights in severance instruments in order to avoid emas-
culation of that statute. That interpretation problem involves the
dual question of (1) whether coal was granted and (2) whether strip
mining rights were granted. From the discussion of authorities on
the first point, one may conclude that coal should not be included
in a grant or reservation of the "minerals" where the only feasible
method of recovery is strip mining, "unless an intention to give the
mineral owner the right to destroy the surface is clearly expressed
or necessarily implied."" 8 Regarding the second point, one may
conclude that strip mining rights should not be implied from a
severance instrument unless strip mining was a known and accept-
ed method at the time of the severance and the minerals can be re-
moved in no' other manner. Thus, if the Montana supreme court
reaches conclusions similar to those of the authorities discussed,
grants of coal strip mining rights will be implied within narrow
limits in future cases, thereby ensuring the vitality of § 50-1039.1.
118. Haughey, supra note 6 at 4-8.
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